Abstract-The rapid decline in size and cost of networked sensors combined with increased incentives for use including monitoring physical fitness, improving public safety, increasing security, and adding convenience is causing the physical and online worlds to become heavily instrumented.
INTRODUCTION
Surveillance and privacy are seemingly locked in a continual game of one-upmanship. In the security context, adversarial relationships exist where an attacker exploits a vulnerability and the defender responds with countermeasures to prevent future attack or exploitation. From there, the cycle continues, with new vulnerabilities and better exploits, against improved countermeasures. In the privacy context, many have feared the government as a highly empowered threat actor who would invasively and ubiquitously violate privacy, perhaps best personified by DARPA's Total Information Awareness initiative or Orwell's 1984 [1, 2] However, commercial companies today offer enticing free products and services in return for user information, examples include search, social networking, email, and collaborative word processing, among myriad other offerings, leading to instrumentation, data collection, and retention on an unprecedented scale. End users, small business, and local governments themselves are often complicit by supporting, enabling, and conducting such activities. Whether a dystopia exists in our future remains to be seen, although we argue panopticon-like environments exist in today's authoritarian regimes and increasingly surveillance is becoming embedded in the fabric of Western society to thwart terrorism, increase business efficiency, monitor physical fitness, track driving behavior, provide free web search, and many other compelling incentives.
Not all are willingly subject to pervasive surveillance. Many people employ countermeasures to frustrate collection practices for many reasons, including to lead a more private life, perform illicit activities, or protect those with whom they interact. Such countermeasures are the subject of this paper.
In order to ground the work, we first define privacy and countermeasures. There are many definitions, but for our purposes the definition from Merriam-Webster is suitable [3] . Privacy is "the quality or state of being apart from company or observation" or "freedom from unauthorized intrusion." For the definition of countermeasures we draw upon U.S. military doctrine and define countermeasures as mechanisms that "deter, deny, disrupt, deceive, dissuade, degrade, destroy and defeat" surveillance systems and privacy degrading mechanisms and regimes [4] . More broadly, we examine "the employment of devices and/or techniques, [that] has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness," [5] in this case the operational effectiveness of networked surveillance systems.
Our primary contribution is a detailed and extensible taxonomy that enables a systematic pursuit of effective surveillance countermeasures suited for the particular social, political, economic, and technological context. While work has been done on the study of individual instances of surveillance countermeasures and to some extent, slightly broader analyses of families of countermeasures, an overarching countermeasure taxonomy has not yet been presented.
A thorough taxonomy is useful to privacy advocates, security practitioners, policy makers, and privacy researchers as well as groups and individuals interested in increasing their personal and collective privacy.
We focus on surveillance countermeasures and privacy in the physical world, but because such instrumentation cannot be dealt with in isolation from the Internet, we also include limited coverage of online countermeasures. Our goal is to be comprehensive, but not exhaustive. New countermeasures are developed on a regular basis and others are so ancient that that evolution has imbued them into the genetic structure of animals, such as the color changing ability of chameleons or the camouflaged pelts of leopards. It is important to note that we do not advocate usage of any given countermeasure, as such usage may be morally wrong or illegal in a given context.
It is difficult to categorically validate any taxonomy, due to unknown potential extensions, but we conducted significant due diligence by gathering countermeasure samples from major popular and technology news sources as well as major privacy watchdog groups including the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Electronic Privacy Information Center for the past 37 months. We have carefully reviewed these approximately 420 news stories, white papers, and scholarly articles, to inform and build out the taxonomy. Due to space constraints, we did not include every example, but carefully selected representative examples and provided extensive citations. In addition, we presented work-in-progress talks to two major hacker conferences, DEFCON and HOPE, to help validate our approach, methodology, and findings [6, 7] . This paper is organized as follows. Section II places our work in the field of related research. Section III presents a model of networked sensor systems. Section IV presents our taxonomy and Section V provides our conclusions and promising directions for future work. [8] . These privacy groups and academic conferences, across their complete range of activities and bodies of work, provide extensive examples of countermeasures and, in many ways, emergent countermeasure taxonomies. We leverage this fact to inform our work.
II
Lawrence Lessig provides detailed analysis on "responses," effectively countermeasures, to privacy risks via four modalities: law, norms, markets, and architecture/code [9] . We carefully considered each modality as a potential root level entry in our taxonomy. Daniel Solove provided a thoughtful privacy taxonomy to help identify and understand privacy violations and included information collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion high-level categories [10] .
While Solove did not focus on countermeasures, his categorization of privacy threats can be studied category-by-category to help guide potential countermeasure analysis and development.
Clarke suggests eight principles for counterveillance (countering surveillance) including independent evaluation of technology, a moratorium on technology deployments, open information flows (transparency), proper justification, public consultation and participation, cost/benefit evaluation, rollback of anti-freedom provisions and laws, and incorporation of design principles that facilitate balance, anonymity, multiple identity, and independent control [11] . We have carefully integrated these principles into our taxonomy.
Military doctrine and tactics also provide useful insights into privacy countermeasures including two contexts: Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and battlefield deception. Shoop's countering IED tenets included mitigating effects of the IED (e.g. via an armored vehicle), defeating the device (e.g. a jammer that blocks IED command signals), targeting the emplacer, targeting funding networks, and disrupting supply chains [12] . This multi-layered approach illustrates the power of targeting the system not just an isolated component, however this taxonomy makes assumptions about the illegality of the activity (i.e. IED usage). In the context of privacy threatening technologies and regimes the activities may or may not be illegal. Military organizations have employed deceptive countermeasures, such as bluffs, camouflage, false radio traffic, and mocked-up equipment for centuries. A study of these battlefield deception techniques is useful to the study of privacy countermeasures. Latimer provides an excellent survey [13] .
Schneier's taxonomy of social networking data which includes service data, disclosed data, entrusted data, incidental data, behavioral data, and derived data categories, does not suggest countermeasures, but is illustrative of the overt and covert ways sensitive data is generated [14] . Conti provided similar analysis in Googling Security, but in the context of web search, email, mapping, and third-party tracking on the web. He suggests web-based information disclosure countermeasures in three major categories: user-centric measures, technical protection, and policy protection [15] . We also commend study of Reidenberg and Cranor's work on the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). P3P is a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) specification to communicate machine readable privacy preferences. Given the complexity, and often ubiquitous, nature of automated surveillance, countermeasures that can operate at machine speed are particularly of interest for the surveillance countermeasure researcher [16] .
III. MODEL
There are many components of a networked surveillance system, each of which may be subject to countermeasures, and an understanding of these components is essential to the development of our taxonomy.
In previous work, we developed a framework for networked surveillance systems, a simplified version is shown in Figure 1 [17] . The framework consists of classes (the colored rectangles) with attributes that describe how the class performs in the surveillance system. These classes are grouped into sets that include people (actors and subjects) and components (the hardware and software that forms the networked surveillance system). In its general form a networked surveillances system utilizes sensors (both active and passive) that measure energy in the environment. For example, an acoustic sensor measures the pressure of sound waves and the charge coupled device (CCD) in a camera measures visible light. The camera may rely upon ambient light (passive sensor) or use a flash (active sensor) to generate improved results. In a digital system the measured energy is quantized and stored, and may undergo local processing and local access by human or machine. The resultant information is then transmitted across a network where the data generated by many sensors is aggregated and stored in centralized systems.
The information then undergoes additional processing and data mining, and is consumed by more human and machine users. The process iteratively continues as the information is further stored, processed, refined and shared with additional users and systems. Such systems are rarely foolproof or leakproof, as each class in the model has vulnerabilities, including human actors and surveillance subjects. For instance, information may be corrupted, leaked, destroyed, or shared under a variety of circumstances including malfeasance, accident, or legal pressure. Our earlier work acknowledged these vulnerabilities without elaborating on them. The taxonomy that follows examines the categories and classes in our model, discusses their vulnerabilities, and then describes corresponding countermeasures that exploit those vulnerabilities. Given that some vulnerabilities are common to multiple classes, there are some countermeasures that are listed in more than one table in the taxonomy. Figure 1 . Networked surveillance system framework, consisting of human actors, system components, and surveillance subejcts [14] . Each entity possesses vulnerabilities from which countermeasures may be derived.
IV. TAXONOMY
Although sensors are the most obvious and visible aspect of a sensor system, we begin our analysis with the actors, since the people who design, build, own and operate networked surveillance systems have the most control over their function and use. Effectively countering the actors produces significant and lasting impacts on the surveillance system.
A. Actors
Our taxonomy consists of two groups of people: actors and subjects. The actors are responsible for creating, deploying, and using networked sensor systems. Subjects are surveilled by those systems. We distinguish these groups because the classes of actors have very different motivations and purposes than the subjects.
In the interplay of measures, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasure, the actors and subjects usually form the opposing sides. As noted in [17] , owners, enablers, and information consumers often share similar purposes and so there are countermeasures common to all three of those classes. Those form the "common" category in Table I .
1) Owners
Owners have many incentives for creating these networked sensor systems: they want to increase the safety and security of their home or office building, they want to use energy or other resources more efficiently, or derive some other benefit from the data collected such as improving personal or employee health or enjoy greater convenience. Businesses and law enforcement officials are common kinds of owners. Eventually, some owners may wish to sell the information collected. This last incentive may not have been the original reason for setting up the system, but once the system is in place and collecting useful and valuable data, there is a temptation to use this data for financial gain, particularly in business contexts. To deter owners from employing overly-invasive sensor systems, or encourage them to remove existing ones, we suggest surveillance countermeasures that target incentives, see Table I .
2) Enablers
Enablers are the people and organizations that design, build, sell, or rent networked sensor systems or their components. For example, those that design, build and install CCTV cameras are enablers. While some enablers might be inspired by patriotism or a desire to increase public safety or wellness, their main incentive is often profit, which can be threatened in many ways, as shown in Table I .
3) Information Consumers
Information Consumers retrieve and utilize the collected data, often aggregated from multiple sensor systems. They have many incentives, such as financial gain, increasing security, monitoring physical fitness and health, improving public safety, adding convenience, even voyeurism. As an example, building security personnel monitor fire and intrusion detection systems to improve building security and the safety of its occupants. Individuals may use a variety of sensors including ones to measure heart rate, caloric intake, blood sugar, and body weight to improve their health or physical fitness. Public safety personnel employ many sensors and sensor systems including radar detectors, red-light cameras, surveillance cameras, drones, and robots to improve public safety. Consumers employ home security systems; home energy monitoring systems, smart phones with cameras, microphones, accelerometers and GPS receivers; E-ZPass toll collection systems; credit cards and vendor loyalty cards; automotive sensor systems like OnStar® and others to improve their security, save money, or add convenience to their lives.
4) Regulators
The regulator class enables, limits, or restricts the capabilities of networked sensor systems in some way. Regulators are usually part of government, but could also be independent organizations such as trade groups or professional societies like the IEEE. In the case of government regulatory agencies such as the FCC or FAA, regulation may be their primary purpose. For trade groups and professional societies, regulatory activity may be just one of many activities. Trade groups and professional societies may regulate directly by developing standards, or indirectly by lobbying government to change a law or regulation. There are two primary types of regulator surveillance countermeasures: actions regulators can take to reduce the damage from sensor networks and actions the public can take to induce regulatory bodies to enact protections. These are shown in Table II .
ACTORS COMPONENTS SUBJECTS

B. Subjects
Subjects, individually and collectively, are the targets of sensor systems. To reduce the invasion of their privacy, subjects can take actions to simply protect themselves, such as wearing a disguise, opting out of data sharing, or deciding not to use certain technologies. Some of these actions will make life less convenient, so subjects balance their privacy interest with whatever benefit they derive from surveilled activity, if any. Subjects can also take actions that protect others as well as themselves, such as advocating for greater regulation or the removal of a red-light camera system in their town. Subject countermeasures are shown in Table III .
C. Components
We identify four classes of components in a networked sensor system, shown in Figure 1 : system, network, storage, and sensor. Each class has attributes and many of the attributes have vulnerabilities against which a subject can perform a countermeasure. Alternatively, the owners, enablers and information consumers are interested in fixing the vulnerabilities and countering the countermeasures in a feedback control system, or a sort of surveillance "arms race." We categorize component countermeasures in Table IV . Note that each day a person can encounter dozens of sensors, so many that we hardly pay any attention to them. In [17] we presented a case study of "Hal," an ordinary citizen going about a very ordinary life; going to the gym, going to work, shopping at a supermarket; who was monitored by at least 20 sensors in an 18-hour period.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
When considered as a whole, the range of potential surveillance countermeasures is dramatic and growing. We believe the taxonomy we present is useful in its current form, but recommend that it be extended as new techniques and strategies emerge. As the development of new sensors and surveillance systems begs the use of countermeasures by the surveilled, the use of countermeasures also invites the development and use of counter-countermeasures. Examples of counter-countermeasures include the use of lobbyists to influence policy makers or a police officer pointing a gun to discourage a videographer filming a police raid, among myriad others [18] . This vicious cycle results in a continued game of one upmanship, or a contest of resources and resolve to determine a victor. For future work we recommend the development of a comprehensive taxonomy of countercountermeasures to complement this paper. Similarly, our work focused on countermeasures in the physical world, we believe a detailed survey of online countermeasures, particularly in the context of the World Wide Web, would be a valuable research contribution. Future work in system design is also promising. System designers are not immune to the security and privacy implications of their designs. By providing classical security protections, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability good designers help ensure secure operation and prevent information leakage, data spills, or eavesdropping by unauthorized parties. Even better, from the perspective of the surveilled, are systems that actively include privacy by design.
This taxonomy categorizes countermeasures, but one should not infer that countermeasure are always employed independently. To achieve the greatest effect countermeasures are often woven together into campaigns of mutually supporting activities. We see such campaigns in military battlefield deception operations, intelligence community counter-surveillance activities, actions of governmental and industry chief privacy officers, and long-term efforts of privacy advocacy groups such as the EFF, EPIC, and the ACLU. In complex campaigns, actors seek to holistically identify surveillance practices and deny, degrade, defeat, or destroy varying parts of the surveillance system for maximum effect through the use of many countermeasures. A comprehensive campaign may seek to undermine incentives of both aggressors and subjects, identify and share location of sensors, seek to create false positives, cause physical destruction of system components, prevent the deployment of sensors and systems, anticipate and counter future aggressor actions, train subjects in counter-surveillance techniques, and exploit weaknesses in the technology and human networks underpinning the surveillance activity, among numerous other strategies.
A taxonomy of countermeasures is useful for critical analysis, but it is only a starting point. For future work, we suggest seeking quantitative means, including suitable equations, metrics, and models, to analyze the efficacy, effectiveness, and risk associated with surveillance countermeasures. Such calculations could take into account factors such as security personnel response time, effort, cost, power requirements, legal authority, system vulnerability, attack surface, actor and subject incentives, data retention policies, data collection policies, and processing strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, models could include insight into how systems are employed and what countermeasures could be used to degrade or defeat various capabilities of the system. Importantly, models could help identify gaps for which no countermeasures exist and drive future research and development.
Targeted surveillance countermeasures (e.g. countermeasures that seek to degrade or defeat specific sensor, system, or processing technologies) are ripe for future exploration. For example, every sensor has limitations that result in some degree of error, how can these weaknesses be exploited to develop more successful countermeasures? In addition, many surveillance systems seek to detect subjects, and if possible, uniquely identify individuals. Is it possible to categorize countermeasures whether they defeat identification algorithms, (e.g. facial recognition) or defeat the more general, and likely more difficult detection (e.g. facial detection) algorithms? And every countermeasure has the potential to itself be countered, as in the model of John Boyd's "ObserveOrient-Decide-Act" (OODA) loop [19] . The legality of any specific countermeasure (and its corresponding countercountermeasure) is open to question, especially if one is countering the "system," "network," or "storage device" components of our model by " hacking back" [20] .
Finally, we suggest further exploration of the societal implications of widespread surveillance, even in contexts where the subject is complicit or the government is well intentioned. Sensors are becoming increasingly prevalent and the future portends sensing of human activities on a global scale of unprecedented proportion. Surveillance networks and the use of countermeasures modify behavior, both individual and in aggregate. When is this good and when is this bad? As a society, perhaps the most important tool is regulators seeking appropriately balanced solutions and "honest" consulting, and not coercion, deception or attempts at desensitization, with the observed regarding surveillance programs. As Lessig famously said, "code is law" [21] . If average citizens, not just criminal actors operating outside the law, feel the need to develop and employ countermeasures perhaps societies should reconsider the use of such privacy invasive technologies.
TABLE I OWNER, ENABLER, AND INFORMATION CONSUMER COUNTERMEASURES
Class of Surveiller Surveillance Countermeasure
Examples
Common
Inconvenience
Administrative burdens, such as additional paperwork, can be tantamount to prohibition
Reputation Tarnishment
Call out bad behavior; publish embarrassing news stories [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] Financial Loss Loss of customers or drop in stock price due to privacy gaff [27] ; lawsuits [28] ; payment of compensations [29] ; pay for privacy business models [30] Harassment Reverse robocalling government leaders [31] Legal Restriction Enact federal, state, and local legislation to prohibit or constrain privacy damaging behavior; modify or strike down poorly written law [33, 33] ; threaten legal action [34] ; investigate suspect practices [35] Praise Praise positive behavior to reinforce success [36] Regulation Policy that prohibits undesired behavior [37] 
Physical Retaliation
Personal threats (or worse) against actors enablers, system owners, regulators, or information consumers [38] Enablers
Regulatory Compliance
Administrative burdens such as compliance testing or licensing requirements for designers or installers can make the cost of development, production, deployment, and use prohibitive.
Legal monopolies
Protective patents to prevent adoption of privacy threatening technologies [39] .
Info.
Cons.
Data Access
Prevent or disrupt access to data, possibly by disrupting the sensor network itself.
TABLE II REGULATOR COUNTERMEASURES
Regulator Countermeasure Examples
Demand Accountability
Google settles with FTC over tracking cookies, pays $22.5M fine [49] Congress questions Google about Glass [40] Enact privacy and data protection laws
European Union plan to enact data protection law [41] End use of privacy invasive systems Los Angeles considers ending use of traffic light cameras [42] 
Increase Procedural Burdens
Require warrant for access to data not informal law enforcement request; limit warrantless laptop searches at borders [43] Investigate FTC orders information from information brokers [44] ; TSA commissions independent study of X-Ray Body Scanners [45] ; Congressional hearings on TSA scanners [46] ; require validation and justification for usage of privacy-threatening systems
Substantive Legal
New York State law makes gun ownerships records private (albeit as an opt-in process); regulations that Privacy Protections limit commercial imagery satellite resolution [47] Regulate Use of Surveillance Technologies
European Commission adopts rules regulating use of security scanners at European airports [48] .
Encourage regulators
Engage Decision Makers
Target political support; vote for politicians supportive of privacy; participating in town hall events [50] ; visiting decision makers in their workplace; contribute to public outcry over privacy-invasive actions and threats [51] ; raise safety concerns about sensor technology [52] Go to court
Sue companies with suspect privacy practices [53] ; German state of Hamburg considers fining Facebook over facial recognition feature [54] ; U.S. Supreme Court rules on use of GPS devices [55] 
Activism
Take personal [56, 57] or collective action to lobby against bad behavior, pending laws [58] [59] [60] ; lobby officials for better privacy practices; participate in public debate; Camover game which challenges participants to destroy surveillance cameras [61] ; civil disobedience (e.g. Tahrir Square); formation of political party (e.g. Pirate Party), formation of own country (e.g. Principality of Sealand); hactivism (e.g. Anonymous);
Conduct and Publish Research
Suggest viable alternatives such as anonymized airport scanner views [62] ; point out security flaws in surveillance systems [63] ; develop systems that allow opting out of sensing [64] ; Solove's "I've Got Nothing to Hide" [65] ; produce research that is admissible in court; EFF's Panopticlick project [66] 
